Simple memorizing tasks have been chosen such as a binary code on a 5 ! 5 matrix. After the establishment of an appropriate protocol, the codifi ed matrices were individually presented to 150 university students (conveniently preselected) who had to memorize them. Multiple presentations were offered seeking perfect performance verifi ed through the correct reproduction of the code. We measured the individual percentage error as a function of the number of successive presentations, and then averaged over the examined population. The learning curve thus obtained decreases (almost monotonically) until becoming virtually zero when the number of presentations attains six. A computer simulation for a similar task is available which uses a two-level perceptron on which an algorithm was implemented allowing for some degree of globality or nonlocality (technically referred to as entropic nonextensivity within a current generalization of the usual, Boltzmann-Gibbs, statistical mechanics). The degree of nonextensivity is characterized by an index q , such that q = 1 recovers the usu-
An artifi cial neural network is a simple dynamical system that processes information in a way loosely modeled on biological reality. Within such a network, a number of highly simplifi ed 'neurons' interact with one another, transforming external and internal information to learn patterns and to store and retrieve memories. Neural networks have become a predominant technology for machine-based forecasting and pattern recognition, quite aside from their obvious relevance to biological modeling. Although controversy persists over the ultimate capability of such systems to capture the full richness of human consciousness, there is no controversy concerning the rich dynamics of neural networks or their relevance to artifi cial intelligence.
One of the simplest neural networks is the 'perceptron, ' designed to recognize optical images in 1957 by Frank Rosenblatt of the Cornell Aeronautics Laboratory. In an elementary perceptron -based very roughly on the biology of the retina -a set of N 'input' neurons feed forward into a set of N 'output' neurons. The input neurons can be viewed as sensory neurons, which receive stimulus directly from the external world; most simply, this information takes binary form, either +1 or -1 for each neuron. The network then feeds this information through a series of weighted links to the second layer of neurons, which produce an internal 'image' or representation of the external stimulus. The state of each secondary neuron is determined through a weighted sum of contributions from the N input neurons connected to it. For the i th output neuron, this sum takes the form ¦ j
Introduction
It is possible to consider that cognitive psychology appeared as a reaction to behaviorist approaches, where the mental content plays the role of a black box [1, 2] . In contrast, this content constitutes a central issue in cognitive sciences. Consequently, the use of computers to implement or imitate human intellectual tasks naturally emerged as a methodological tool, and even as a powerful metaphor, in the investigation of mental processes such as intelligence, learning, memorization, among others. It is along these lines that we prepared a sequence of experiments with humans, to be later on compared with similar experiments, or simulations, done with computers provided with appropriate algorithms, in particular simple perceptrons. It should of course be clear that such comparisons have philosophical implications [ see, for instance, 1, 3-5] , which we address in the present work only in the Conclusions.
In the present study, two different memorization tasks were implemented. The fi rst of them was relatively simple, namely the memorization of simple binary codes in 5 ! 5 and 7 ! 7 matrices. Most of the present effort is dedicated to this analysis. The second task was, intellectually speaking, sensibly more complex. It consisted of put pattern, the second layer of neurons should respond with a specifi c 'target' output pattern that 'registers' or 'recognizes' that input. A perceptron will not do this, in general, if the connection strengths J i , j take just any random set of values. But the network -like the human mind -can be trained to adjust and adapt through a sequence of repeated trials. In each trial, the network is presented with the stimulus and produces its response. A 'supervisor' -the person training the perceptron -then assesses how much the response differs from that desired, and alters the connection weights so as to produce a more accurate response in the future. The 'learning dynamics' of the model are the rules used to update the weights J i , j so as to achieve better performance. Clearly, some kinds of learning rules may perform better than others, leading to more rapid or more efficient learning.
In this paper, Tsallis and colleagues explore the dynamics of human learning by comparing the performance of perceptrons with different learning dynamics to that of real human subjects engaged in a simple learning task. Their aim is to see which kind of learning dynamics gives more realistically 'human' results. A perceptron can learn through 'local' rules, in the sense that the change of a particular connection weight J i , j is tied only to the error in output neuron i ; it depends only on whether that particular neuron does or does not produce the desired output. Alternatively, the network could learn on the basis of a more 'global' assessment of network performance, involving errors in any of the output neurons. Tsallis et al. fi nd that global learning seems to provide a better match to real human behaviour. The gap in complexity between a simple perceptron and the full neural apparatus of the human mind is obviously immense, so the ultimate signifi cance of this result is diffi cult to assess. Yet it does suggest that global coupling of neurons might offer some adlearning ambiguous images, where the fi gure-background reversal is crucial. Although semantic and strategic aspects are present in both learning tasks, the second one is by far more delicate and reveals higher level cognitive phenomena. Consistently, our study leads to quantitative information concerning the fi rst task, whereas only some qualitative features were determined for the latter.
At the level of the comparison with computational simulations, our emphasis is put on whether learning occurs in an extensive or a nonextensive manner. These terms will be mathematically defi ned and further analyzed in the section 'Entropic Concepts and Computational Simulations'. They are currently used in statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, branches of physics dedicated to the study of the connections between the microscopic and the macroscopic worlds. At the present stage, it is enough to think of extensivity as a form of nonglobality or locality [6, 7] , as opposed to nonextensivity or globality or nonlocality . In a loose manner, they respectively correspond to the molecular and molar approaches in psychology, i.e., the system is perceived as the sum of its parts, or as different from the sum of its parts.
In following section, we present the experimental study with humans. In the secal, extensive, statistical mechanics, whereas q 0 1 implies some degree of nonextensivity. In other words, q -1 is a (very sensitive) measure of globality (gestalt perception or learning). The computer curves fi t well the human result for q Ӎ 1.02. It has been verifi ed that even extremely small departures of q from unity lead to strong differences in the learning curve. Our main observation is that, for the very specifi c learning task on which we focus here, humans perform similarly to slightly nonextensive perceptrons. In addition to this experiment, some preliminary studies were done concerning the human learning of ambiguous images (based on fi gure-background perception). In spite of the complexity of drawing conclusions from such a comparison, some generic trends can be established. Moreover, the enormous and well-known diffi culty for computationally defi ning semantic, hierarchic and strategic structures reveals clear-cut differences between human and machine learning. In experimental studies, the authors presented human subjects with various matrices with circles and crosses as entries (see their fi gure 1, for example). Subjects were briefl y shown a random matrix of such symbols, and then after a few seconds were asked to reproduce it. With repeated trials, the subjects' performance gradually improved. In their fi gure 5, Tsallis et al. present the empirical 'learning curve' that shows how the error averaged over all subjects decreased with successive trials. Here the 'error' is defi ned as the fraction of entries in the matrix that the subject identifi ed incorrectly. These results offer a snapshot of the dynamics of human learning in a simple image recognition problem. After ten trials or so, most of the subjects had learned the pattern almost without error.
The authors then compared these results to the learning dynamics of a simple perceptron. A perceptron capable of learning the pattern encoded in a 5 x 5 matrix has to have 25 input neurons and 25 output neurons. Initially, the authors chose the weights J i,j of the connections between these neurons at random. They then let the perceptron 'learn' through a series of trials (see their reference 16 for further details) on the basis of the dynamical equation,
where V net is the 'error' of the perceptron and n i,j represents a noise term. The error function V net can be chosen in different ways, but always measures how much the perceptron's actual output differs from its desired output. So this equation describes a 'walk' through the space of possible connection weights J i,j that always proceeds in the direction of steepest descent. Specifically, the vector -∂/∂ J i,j ( V net ) defi nes the direction in the high-dimensional space corresponding to the J i,j in which V net decreases most rapidly. At each trial, the dytion after that, we describe the entropic concepts that we use with regard to the computational simulations that have been implemented. In the section 'Comparison of the Human and Computer Results', we compare both approaches, namely with humans and computers. Finally, we conclude in the last section.
The Experiment
The experiment consists in individually learning fi xed binary codes (represented by the signs + and y ) in n ! n matrices. It was presented to each person, initially one 5 ! 5 matrix ( fi g. 1 ) and, then, two 7 ! 7 binary matrices ( fi g. 2 , 3 ). In order to avoid any kind of uncontrolled cultural effect, the location of the symbols + and y in all the matrices was randomly generated by computer and fi xed once for ever. It was carried out with approximatively 150 university students whose specialty was not directly related to geometry, mathematics or images, in order to avoid professional bias. For instance, students of physics, mathematics, engineering, architecture, visual publicity were excluded. The experiment population was mainly constituted by students of psychology, administration, social service and social communication of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. Approximately 30 students were used for preliminary tests in order to fi x an optimal experimental protocol (matrix sizes, binary code of each matrix, exhibition and hiding times, among others).
Then, precisely 120 (92 females and 28 males) students were exposed to the same protocol, and only their results were taken into account for quantitative purposes in the statistical processing (averaging, in particular). Their ages ranged between 17 and 27 years, the majority of them being around 22 years old.
Each of them was sequentially isolated in a peaceful room and tested, for about 40 min, by one of us. Information about the scope of the research was given to each one of the 120 individuals. They were told that the experiment was not measuring their intelligence (so that they would feel relaxed), and that it was important for understanding how learning occurs (so that they would seriously try to perform satisfactorily). After these instructions were given to each one of the 120 students, three matrices were shown. In all cases, a 5 ! 5 matrix was fi rst shown, one of the two complementary matrices (i.e., obtained by interchanging the symbols + and y ). Then, one of the four 7 ! 7 matrices was shown (matrix in fi g. 2 to 30 students, matrix in fi g. 3 to other 30, and so on). Then the other noncomple- namics of equation 1 drive the J i,j to evolve in that direction.
In effect, the function V net can be thought of as defi ning a landscape in the multi-dimensional space defi ned by the connection weights J i,j . The initial values J i,j ( t = 0) identify a starting point on the landscape, and with successive trials the system alters the J i,j , always seeking to descend into lower regions of the landscape, thereby reducing the error of the neural network. The term n i,j represents a 'noise' in the dynamics, which is useful as it prevents the system's trajectory from becoming trapped in shallow valleys of the V net landscape. The noise term eventually kicks the system out of such valleys, and permits it to continue searching for the true global minimum -the values J i,j that minimize V net and make the perceptron produce the correct output.
Tsallis et al. focus on the nature of the function V net , which determines if the learning dynamics are 'local' or 'global'. In many studies of neural networks this function is taken to be local and of the form V net = ⌺ i V i which includes contributions from each output neuron independently. In this case, the weights associated with a particular output neuron k , J k,j , j = 1,..., 25 will be induced to change only if that k th neuron is specifi cally in error. But the function V net can, of course, take a more general form, which would cause the J k,j , j = 1,..., 25 to evolve even if output neuron k were correct. As suggested in the authors' ref. 16 , one way to explore this possibility of 'global' learning is to introduce a function of the form
where V net is an error function of local form, with ␤ and q positive real numbers. The evolution equation for the J i,j then becomes In their fi gures 10-12, Tsallis et al. present learning curves -error measures versus time -for their perceptron running with various different values of T = 1/ ␤ and q . As the curves indicate, the perceptron's performance depends strongly on the value of q , especially for values in the immediate vicinity of q = 1. The results in fi gure 11 in particular reveal that global rules lead to slower learning, which may be expected as this allows connection weights to change even if the output neurons to which they are linked are already giving the right output. Global learning allows the network to introduce errors in some neurons in the hope of decreasing the overall error.
The culmination of the paper resides in the comparison of these perceptron results to the performance of the real human subjects. The authors claim that the perceptron fi ts the averaged human results best for a value of q = 1.02 when T = 0.02. So, in the context of this two-layer perceptron at least, the most 'human' results ensue from if the network is endowed with a signifi cant component of global dynamics in its learning. This result is at least in resonance with intuition: the human mind is clearly fl exible enough when learning to allow itself to make mistakes on minor subtasks if this can improve overall performance.
As the authors point out, the form of the function V _ net in equation 2 has a direct link to ideas in theoretical physics. In 1988, one of the authors (Constantino Tsallis) proposed a formal generalization of the mentary 7 ! 7 matrix was shown. The sequence of each individual test was as follows:
(1) After some general explanations, an empty 5 ! 5 matrix and the y and + symbols were shown, and the subjects were asked to randomly fi ll the matrix with the two symbols. This step aimed to provide to the individuals some familiarity with the experiment.
(2) Then fi gure 1 was exhibited during 8 s and then hidden. The student had to try to reproduce it on the spot on an empty matrix. When this was done, the operation was repeated after a rest interval of 10 s. The 5 ! 5 matrix was never shown more than 10 times (the individuals started feeling tired after 10 times). The matrix was considered to be learnt if no error was made after two successive exhibitions.
(3) Then the learning test was repeated by successively using two of the four 7 ! 7 matrices, one at a time.
(4) Finally, the student was asked to briefl y describe how he/she proceeded to learn.
The error ε i ( t ) of the i -th individual ( i = 1, 2, 3, ..., 120; t = 0) corresponds to the initial random fi lling) is defi ned as the number of wrong elements of
Typical results are presented in fi gures 4-6 for the 5 ! 5 and in fi gures 7 and 8 for one of the four 7 ! 7 matrices (the fi gures associated with the other three 7 ! 7 matrices are quite similar in fact). Although in a quite different context, results that have some connection with the present ones have been exhibited in [8] .
The averages
(with N = 120 if the entire set of students is used for averaging) are shown in fi gure 5 . These curves already achieved the aspect presented in this fi gure when the averages were performed with approximately 80 individuals. Using the entire set of 120 results just improved the precision but incorporated no new qualitative elements in the curves. If we defi ne the learning time as the number of times shown before learning, excluding those who did not succeed learning that particular matrix until the end of the experiment, we can check that it is of the order of 6.
Incidentally we verifi ed an interesting (and indeed unexpected) cultural phenomenon. For the 5 ! 5 matrix we were expecting [ ε ](0) to be close to 25/2 = 12. 5 since, before starting to show the codifi ed matrix, we asked the students to randomly fi ll the empty matrix with symbols y and +, indicated in this order above the empty matrix, if we look at them from left to right. In variance with this reasonable expectation, we found, for the fi rst 60 students,
[ ε ](0) Ӎ 14. After some hesitation about what could be the cause of this asymmetry (e.g., could it be the different semantics humans associate with a circle or a cross?), we speculated that it could be the fact that Portuguese language (within which the Brazilian population is educated) is read from left to right . Then, to the second and last set of 60 students, an empty fi gure 1 was presented with the symbols in the ordering + y instead of y +. Very symptomatically, we then obtained [ ε ](0) Ӎ 11. 5, the overall average being consequently (14 + 11.5)/2 = 12. 75, rea- 6 . Histogram of the probabilities corresponding to the 5 ! 5 matrix. The abscissa is the ordinal of the presentation at which the individual learnt the matrix: 82 (out of 120) individuals learnt the matrix before or at the 9th presentation (we recall that the 10th presentation was used to confi rm the learning at the 9th one); 38 individuals did not succeed (and are not computed in the histogram).
classical entropy of statistical physics. That generalization (the authors' equation 5) also involves a parameter q in much the same way as the 'global' error function V _ net . For q = 1, the Tsallis entropy becomes equivalent to the Boltzmann-Gibbs entropy of standard statistical mechanics, just as the function V _ net becomes equal to the local function V net . Tsallis and others have suggested that this generalized entropy may be useful for describing complex systems that are often 'more than the sum of their parts'. Examples would include systems with long-range interactions (such as those dominated by gravitational interactions) and others in, for example, biology or the social world. An intriguing aspect of this generalization is that it permits a transformation of ordinary statistical mechanics into a so-called 'non-extensive' statistical physics based on equations such as the authors' equation 7. These ideas have generated great excitement among many physicists, and their relevance to the larger science of complex systems continues to be explored.
Regardless of these larger questions, however, the present paper does suggest that the global character of learning dynamics -at least within relatively simple neural networks -produces a learning schedule that is similar to that seen in humans. This insight may prove useful in building more realistic models of human learning or more powerful strategies for machine learning. As a fi nal conclusion the authors suggest that globality (nonextensivity) appears to be a main characteristic of human learning, and consistently propose the concept of 'homo metaphoricus'.
Mark Buchanan sonably close to 12.5 as initially expected! To confi rm this cultural cause of the observed asymmetry, it would be interesting to repeat the experiment with, say, Arabic students (educated within right-toleft reading).
Another interesting feature that we observed is that, for many individuals, [ ε ](2) 1 [ ε ](1), thus systematically contradicting the overall monotonic tendency of [ ε ]( t ) to decrease with time. The reason for this kind of a priori unexpected behavior appeared to be (as commented by the individuals themselves during the free fi nal conversation) that, after seeing for the fi rst time the code to be learnt, the student dedicated a good part of his (her) attention to establish a 'strategy' for learning rather to properly learn the matrix. Let us mention, by the way, that in an experiment like the present one it is quite hard to differentiate between learning the strategy and memorizing the matrix within that strategy.
This kind of modelization is supported by the fact that, several months after conclusion of the experiment, quite a few students still remembered the strategy, while they had completely forgotten the particular matrix code itself.
Let us now briefl y comment on the second experiment we developed. We chose several ambiguous images, all of them being susceptible of two mutually excluding interpretations on the basis of fi gure-background reversal. For example, if one sees in fi gure 9 [9] a young woman, one does not simultaneously see the old woman, and reciprocally. We implemented this more complex learning task by showing the image and then asking to the individual what he (she) sees. Then we tried to count the time needed by the person in order to recognize the other image interpretation. This perception mechanism is sometimes referred to as reversal of the fi gure-background. It turned out that the times involved in this type of experiment, and very specifi cally the slowness of learning, if any, how to recognize the reversal, were so ill-defi ned that we decided not to proceed with this protocol. The question of how to conveniently quantify such learning remains, therefore, an open question [ see also 10, 11] .
Entropic Concepts and Computational Simulations
A great variety of computer learning algorithms are available in the literature. It is clear that all of them process, in one way or another, information. Entropy is well known to be a convenient tool for quantifying (lack of) information. It can therefore be used in the context of any learning algorithm, at least in principle. We shall use it here in connection with the specifi c perceptron we shall describe later on. For convenience, let us briefl y review at this point some basic notions about the entropic forms we are referring to in the present paper. The Boltzmann-GibbsShannon (BGS) entropy is the basis of standard statistical mechanics and thermodynamics. It is defi ned (in its discrete version) by Huang [12] Synopsis Fig. 7 . Average error associated with the learning of the 7 ! 7 + diagonal matrix as a function of the number of presentations: the circles correspond to averaging the results of 30 individuals to whom the + diagonal matrix was shown in fi rst place; the squares correspond to averaging the results of 30 individuals to whom the + diagonal matrix was shown in second place (after having seen, in fi rst place, the y column matrix). Fig. 8 . Histogram of the probabilities corresponding to the fi rst shown 7 ! 7 matrix, either the + diagonal or the y diagonal ones. The abscissa is the ordinal of the presentation at which the individual learnt the matrix: 50 (out of 60) individuals learnt the matrix before or at the 9th presentation (we recall that the 10th presentation was used to confi rm the learning at the 9th one); 10 individuals did not succeed (and are not computed in the histogram). for simplicity, we have taken Boltzmann constant equal to unity. This entropy becomes maximal at equiprobability, i.e., p i = 1 /W for all i , and achieves the value
which is the celebrated Boltzmann formula. If we consider a composite system made of two (probabilistically) independent systems A and B , i.e., if we assume that 
which can be phrased as the entropy of the whole is the sum of the entropies of the parts. The entropic form (1) is the basis of standard, Boltzmann-Gibbs (BG), statistical mechanics and thermodynamics, and property (3) is known as extensivity or additivity. This entropy, as well as others, are in some sense ubiquitous. Indeed, they emerge in a great variety of discussions. For example, they have often been used concerning complex phenomena such as the organization of living matter [ see, for instance, 13] , as well as other types of organization, including that of knowledge (e.g., memorization and learning), economics, linguistics, to mention but a few [ see, for instance, 14, 15] . Before addressing the generalization of S BGS we are interested in here, let us mention that optimization of equation 1 in the presence of a constraint of the type
(where E i might be say microscopic energy levels), leads to
where ␤ is a parameter to be determined through the value of the constraint. In statistical mechanics, equation 4 is in fact the celebrated BG weight.
In 1988, one of us (C.T.) proposed [14] the generalization of BG statistical mechanics on the basis of a more general entropic form, namely
q being any real number. We can verify that S 1 = S BGS , in other words, the BG formalism becomes now the q = 1 particular case of this more general formalism. If we assume, once again, two independent systems A and B , we can prove that
which can be phrased as the generalized entropy of the whole is different from the sum of the generalized entropies of the parts . This property is referred to as nonextensivity or nonadditivity . To be more precise, if we take into account that S q is always zero or positive, equation 6 implies that we obtain [14]
where, as before, ␤ is a parameter to be determined through the value of the constraint. Notice that for the normal regime for ␤ , i.e., ␤ 1 0, we have, for large values of E i , a long powerlaw tail for q 1 1, whereas we have a short exponential tail for q = 1; fi nally, for q ! 1, we have a cutoff. Equation 7 can be re-written in the BG form, namely
where
In other words, in what concerns the optimizing distribution, E i ' plays the role of an effective energy which replaces E i (in the q ] 1 limit, of course we recover E i ' ] E i ). This effective energy can be used to q-generalize a variety of microscopic and mesoscopic equations. One such example is the Langevin equation, on which the perceptron that we use here has been constructed.
As we see, the entropic property (6) has a kind of gestalt -like fl avor. Its use constitutes a natural choice if we desire to deal with informational phenomena involving global or nonlocal aspects. Since this might well be the case of human learning, we have adopted this formalism in order to have the possibility of comparing human and machine learning.
To do so, a nonextensive perceptron has been implemented [16] which performs a task similar to the learning of the 5 ! 5 and 7 ! 7 matrices that were exposed to the students, according to the experimental protocol we described earlier. In order to perform calculations, the perceptron needs an internal dynamical equation. To fulfi ll this requirement, the q -generalized Langevin equation previously introduced by Stariolo [17] was implemented in the perceptron. Some typical runs of the perceptron are shown in fi gure 4 , and typical averages are shown in fi gures 10-12 [ from 16] .
Comparison of the Human and Computer Results
The purpose of the present section is to compare the results obtained with humans and those obtained with the nonextensive perceptron. The comparison will be illustrated on the learning/memorizing of the 5 ! 5 matrix. We shall verify that, for this specifi c task, the human and perceptron results can be amazingly similar. This can be checked on fi gure 4 .
The three individual results (on the left) are indeed similar to the perceptron realizations with three different initial conditions (on the right). The three human examples have been chosen as to exhibit typical cases. The three perceptron examples have been chosen in order to have an overall aspect similar to the human ones.
Averages over many realizations of the data just presented are shown (with dots) in fi gures 10 and 12 . We have rescaled the time variable in such a way that comparison becomes possible on the same graph. More precisely, we have expressed time in units of the corresponding half-time t m , defi ned as the value of time at which the average error curve decays to its half value. A rescaling such as this one is clearly necessary in order to quantitatively compare the results. Indeed, human 'time' is here represented as the number of presentations, whereas perceptron 'time' essentially corresponds to the number of computer iterations. These two numbers being of a completely different nature [ see also 6] , it is clear that rescaling becomes necessary.
We may consider fi gure 12 as the central result of the present work. We verify that, for the specifi c task of learning/memorizing 25 binary states (on a matrix for the humans), humans and machines are remarkably similar. Of course, the parameters of the perceptron have been chosen in such a way as to optimize the overall fi tting to the human data. The number of individuals that have been averaged is 120, and we have verifi ed that no sensible variation is obtained under increase of that number. In the language of statistical mechanics, we may say that we have practically attained the thermodynamic limit. There is a little bump in the human results at t/t m Ӎ 2: we have not identifi ed its origin (perhaps fatigue of the tested individuals, perhaps something else). The perceptron does not exhibit such a bump. As we see, the perceptron that fi ts the data has some degree of nonextensivity, as was conjectured in the beginning of the present work. Although q is quite close to unity, we must take into consideration the fact that the error curves have been shown to be (see fi g. 11 ) extremely sensitive to the degree of nonextensivity in the neighborhood of q = 1 (extensive case).
Conclusions
In summary, we have implemented an experimental study aiming to measure the learning/memorizing performance of humans on simple codes on matrices. It is on purpose that we simultaneously use the words 'learning' and 'memorization'. Indeed, the experiments clearly showed that the improvement of correct answers was due to a mixture of memorization of the specifi c codifi ed example and devising learning strategies (symmetry rules and other mnemonic tricks) in order to efficiently implement the memorization effort. In fact, after several months, we informally verifi ed that the individuals had for- 12 . Time evolution of the error for the 5 ! 5 matrix, where t m is the value of t at which the error becomes half of its value at t = 0. The dots correspond to averaging the experimental data with 120 humans. The continuous curve has been obtained averaging a large number of initial conditions for the perceptron with the gain parameter g = 0.91, the temperature-like parameter T = 0. 02 and the entropic index q = 1.02. It is with these values that optimal fi tting was obtained for the experimental data. The parabolic extrapolation of the experimental data corresponding to t = 1 , 2 and 3 provides, for t = 0, the value of 0.316 for the percentage error, which corresponds to 0.316 ! 25 = 7.9 for the absolute error. Therefore the value of t m corresponds to the value of t at which the absolute error equals 7.9/2 = 3. 95. Since no integer value of t corresponds exactly to this value, a linear interpolation has been performed, yielding t m = 4.2 for the experimental data with 120 individuals [ see 16 for further details ] .
gotten the codes, but still remembered the strategy they used for memorizing them.
Through comparison with machine results, we verifi ed that this particular human task was executed with clear indication of a slight, though very effi cient nonextensivity (or globality) quantifi ed by the entropic index q . This index appeared to be slightly above unity, which characterizes slower learning/memorizing (the error curves takes longer to become basically zero), but perhaps higher ability for devising strategies. It is then allowed to conjecture that human nature evolved, during successive generations, not so much to strongly improve the speed associated with such kind of memorization, but rather to improve the capacity of spontaneously and quickly generating intellectual strategies for performing tasks such as memorization.
We also applied a similar experimental protocol for learning/memorizing how to analyze complex fi gure-background images in order to quickly realize alternative (typically two) interpretations of the fi gures. We verifi ed that, unless much more sophisticated experimental protocols and computational algorithms are devised, cognitive tasks with important semantic content are by all means nontrivial to measure and compare. For such complex tasks, even more than for the simple binary learning/memorization addressed here, the role of strategies might well be fundamental, although this remains to be proved. On more general grounds, the scenario which emerges is that nonextensivity seems to serve to humans for achieving abduction , one of Charles Sanders Pierce's three basic forms of inference [ see 18 and references therein ] . In other words, given its intrinsic nonlocal nature (strong collective correlations are necessary for making the entropic index q to differ from unity), it is plausible that nonextensivity constitutes the structure necessary to make metaphors . Given the very high intellectual level attributed, since Aristotle, to metaphors [19] , it is allowed to think that it has some specifi c relation with the nature of the one that we might consider as the animal who makes metaphors . We may use 'homo metaphoricus' to express this concept. Further developments, on both philosophical and cognitive-psychological grounds, within the frame that we have outlined here would naturally be very welcome. They could reinforce or exclude the interpretation that our present human-machine comparison suggests.
